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Both industry and rm characteristics inuence the survival of a rm in an industry
over time. Aging, size, structure are factors often discussed in the literature, but public
intervention eects - through public quality labeling for example - may also have an
eect that is examined here. We use data on French rms producing cheese under
public quality label or not over the period 1990-2006. We perform a nonparametric
estimation using Kaplan-Meier estimators as well as proportional hazard rate models
to assess the impact of such factors on rms survival.
Our results conrm existing ndings on rm survival determinants. We also shed
light on the eect of public intervention into that industry. More precisely, our focus on
public quality labeling in the French cheese industry shows that quality label reduces
the risk of exiting for rms and more particularly for small rms. In other words, public
intervention in this industry is well designed to increase the competitiveness of small
rms enabling the coexistence on the market of both small and large rms.
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11 Introduction
In line with the successive reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy that tends to eliminate
price support and use non distortional measures that are decoupled from production in the
European Union, the European Commission (EC) has developed an EU quality policy. Its
objective is to valorize and protect agricultural and food products through the diversication
of agricultural production in order to 'achieve a better balance between supply and demand
on the markets' (European-Commission (1996)).Public intervention, though, may enhance
social welfare by providing public labels that certies the quality of the product. In particular,
smaller rms that can nd it too expensive to signal individually the quality of their products
can collectively signal it by sharing the cost of quality signal through public quality label.
Some countries have adopted this kind of regulation for many years. For instance, the AOC
(Appellation d'Origine Controll ee) regulation in France and the DOC (Denominazione di
Origine Controllata) in Italy have been respectively created in 1935 and in 1963.
Our goal is to assess the ability of such a public policy for quality to sustain the com-
petitiveness of rms and determine which rms have beneted from it. From the theoretical
literature on geographical indication (GI), we know that public labels are an ecient tool to
provide quality. In a perfect competitive market with free entry, Moschini et al. (2008) show
that an equilibrium exists where GI producers benet from positive externalities linked to
the sharing of GI certication cost, which makes possible the production of GI. The perfect
competitive setting for GI products may not always be the adequate market structure to
consider given the specicity of the territory, the input and process requirements required in
the certication regulation. This is at least the case in the average run where entry adap-
tation is dicult and even impossible (Hayes et al. (2004)). Moreover, perfect competition
applies when the GI geographical area is large enough and when there is no land constraint
so that the GI products do not cover much of the local agricultural production and pro-
duction cannot be controlled. One might thus consider the protability of GI in a context
of non competitive markets where production is somehow controlled and where this supply
control may enhance the development of geographical indication market (cf. Marette and
Crespi (2003) and Lence et al. (2007)). If the quality label meets the consumer needs, the
innovation in production and marketing developed by the operators for labeled products may
lead to a successful activity for those operators.
While the theoretical literature on the protability of public quality label is extensive,
empirical ndings are scarce. This paper tries to ll this gap by analyzing how GI-like label
can contribute to the success of rms that voluntary enter into such a quality certication
scheme. To accomplish this, we provide an empirical analysis of the French AOC label, which
is older than its EU equivalent PDO (Protected Designation of Origin).
The performance of dairy rms is measured through their life duration on the market
or "survival". It is one of the most widely used empirical measure of performance (Foster
et al. (2008)). Firm survival has been shown to be strongly related to other performance
measures as protability and growth and gives a better understanding on industrial strate-
gies (cf. Dunne et al. (1988)). These results were obtained using standard statistical tools in
survival analysis. This methodology has been widely used to analyze how industry or rm
characteristics can inuence rms survival, but not to analyze public intervention, which may
be a key driver of agricultural and agro-food rms. For instance, government payments in
the United States have been showed to increase slightly the survival of farm businesses and
2particularly of bigger farms (Key and Roberts (2006)). In this article, we rather focus on the
impact of government intervention on agrofood rms and we analyze how AOC quality label
has contributed to the development of dairy rms and to the current structure of the dairy
industry.
The article is organized as follows. The next section review the determinants of rm
survival. Section 3 provides an overview of the dataset and discusses its strengths and weak-
nesses for measuring rm survival. Section 4 presents the methodology used to estimate rm
survival and Section 5 provides the main estimation ndings. The nal section discusses
conclusions and implications for future research.
2 Determinants of Firm Survival
he relation between performance and survival has been empirically shown in the literature.
Measure of performance through total factor productivity aects survival (Bellone et al.
(2006) and Foster et al. (2008)). Lower performance is observed some years before their fail-
ure (Kiyota and Takizawa (2006)). Dierent factors may explain survival. Various "stylized
facts" have been drawn from the empirical literature on rm survival, entry and exit. These
facts apply in many countries and for many industrial sectors (Geroski (1995) and Caves
(1998)). Both industry and rm characteristics inuences rms' duration length. Substan-
tial rates of entry and exit is recurrently found in a number of countries. In this section,
the main ndings are summarized. We use these ndings to construct the empirical strategy
when testing the determinants of cheese rm dynamics.
The age of rms is an important feature of rm survival. New rms face high risk of
failure during the rst years of their existence (newness). Their capacity to survive depends
on their ability to gather market information and to modify their strategy to the post-entry
environment. Firm mortality then declines over time. The oldest rms may suer from
erosion of technology and products (obsolescence) over time so that their failure rate may
be high (aging). However, they may also benet from strong trademarks that help them
increase their longevity. Firm size is also a major determinant of survival (smallness). This
factor is relevant both for new and older rms but its impact is stronger on the dynamics
of new rm. Dierent factors may explain this fact. First, small-sized rms may have more
diculty to raise capital. Second, tax law can be more detrimental compared to larger rms.
Third, public regulation aects more smaller rms. In addition, large rms may be favored
in the competition on the labor market. Considering that the failure rate is increasing with
the size of irretrievable outlay needed to move from minimal or fringe entry to optimal-scale
operation, the size of irretrievable outlays also aects the survival of rms. It results that
small rms may have a higher failure rate as they will nd it more dicult to reach the
minimum eciency size at which they will be able to operate. Another explanation of the
size impact on survival is related to the costs of labor and capital. If they are high, this could
be detrimental to new/small rms that will have more diculty to develop their activities
and favor older/larger rms. In addition to age and size, the structure of the rm may also
aect rms' dynamic. As shown by Disney et al. (2003), when an establishment is part of a
group, it increases its survival rate relative to a single establishment. This result supports
3the idea that establishments that are part of a group can learn from other establishments of
the group and get better market information compared to single establishments.
The dynamics of rms also depend on the characteristics of the industry under considera-
tion. Comparison between dierent industries in dierent countries reveals common industry
determinants for survival patterns. Both entry and concentration depend on the sunkness of
incumbents' commitment and more generally on trade barriers, which has an incidence on
survival length. Trade barriers in an industry can arise from high minimum eciency scale
(MES), capital intensity, advanced technology or product dierentiation and innovation.
In the next section, we analyze the impact on rm dynamics of the most relevant factors
identied above, age, size, MES and single establishment rm. On the example of the French
cheese industry, we study the impact of some form of innovation through public labeling
(AOC).
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use rm and plant surveys covering the period 1990-2006 provided by the French Admin-
istrative Direction of Statistics (INSEE). The rst main set of information reports economic
and administrative information at the rm level (EAE) while the second set is reporting pro-
duction, activities and more detailed information on the industrial process at the plant level
for dairy rms (EAL). 1 The rst set is available only for rms with more than 20 employees,
while the second set is exhaustive at the France level.
The proportion of AOC in the total production of cheese amounts to around 17%. We
focus in this study on AOC cheese made from cow (30 AOC) and sheep milk (3 AOC) which
represents 97% of milk used in the processing of AOC cheese. Each observation gives us
information on rms that might be constituted of dierent plants.
The survival analysis is performed on the 1430 rms observed during the period 1990-
2006, for which we were able to identify if the rm was producing cheese with AOC label
or not. The nal dataset provides information on all rms involved in cheese production.2
Among those 485 rms observed on the period, cheese production may or not be the main
activity of the rm. When rms have other activities, cheese is most often the main one.
Other activities include dairy products other than cheese. We choose to do the analysis at
the rm level rather than at the plant level. An analysis at the rm level is more relevant
as AOC like strategy is decided at the rm level and not at the plant level. Moreover, it
enables us to take into account rm characteristics that may inuence rm survival as its
number of plants or its product mix. Entry and exit data thus correspond to the creation
and destruction of rms. Firms are considered to be active as long as at least one of its plant
is active (i.e. produces cheese).
We compute the time spells corresponding to the survival of the surveyed rms using the
previously described data sets. By construction these time spells are evaluated as intervals
measured in years over the period 1990-2006. Indeed, our data indicate that a rm was
present in the sample during a given year. But, when a rm disappeared in the following
year, the exact time (day or week) the exit has occurred is not known. In this case the
1EAE stands for Enqu^ ete Annuelle d'Entreprise while EAL is the Enqu^ ete Annuelle Laiti ere, both provided
by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.)
2Accounting data are not available for plants that are reported in EAL and that are not linked with rms
present in the EAE baseline. These plants are reported as small rms of less than 20 employees.
4transition times are said to be grouped and discrete-time hazard models are used to deal
with such data. Thus the minimum value of a time spell is one year, and its maximum value
is 17. One average, a rm survives 8 years in the industry, for the period considered.
Now consider the covariates that can aect the survival of dairy rms. These variables
are time-varying variables. The variable AOCsharet represents the share of AOC production
relative to the total cheese production of the rm in year t. On average, the share of AOC
production is quite stable (around 45%). Oldt is a dummy variable that indicates whether
the rm was present or not before the beginning of the period under scrutiny. The dummy
variable MESt indicates whether a rm has reached or not the minimum eciency scale
dened as the median rm production by category of cheese in year t. We nally consider
size variables. The cheese industry is mainly composed of small rms (Smallt). We observe
a large majority of rms with less than 20 employees on their rst annual report (78%). On
the contrary, big rms (Bigt) are those with more than 100 employees, they are a bit less
numerous than rms of medium size (Mediumt). The share of large rms increases over the
period from 9% in 1990 to 14% in 2006, while the share of small rms decreases from 79%
to 67%.
4 Empirical Methodology
By the denition of the period covered by the surveys (1990-2006), three dierent time spells
can be observed: (1) Complete time spell when a rm enters the sample before 1990, and
exits before 2006, (2) right-censored time spell when a rm enters after 1990, and is still alive
in 2006, and (3) left-truncated time spell when a rm entered before 1990, and exits before
2006 or is still alive in 2006. We can identify this latter type of time spell because the surveys
indicate if a rm was active or not before 1990. But, for most of the rms that were active
before this year, we do not know when they have been created. Fortunately, left truncation
will not aect the maximum likelihood estimators presented below. A showed by Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal (2008), the correct contribution to the likelihood of a left-truncated
rm under delayed entry is obtained by discarding the periods preceding 1990.
The starting point for modeling the survival of rms using the previously dened time
spells, is the discrete-time hazard function. Let T be the period of exit and xi a vector (k1)
of covariates. The discrete-time hazard function is dened as the probability of exit of a rm
at any discrete time t, given that rm i has not exited yet i.e.
hi;t = Prob[Ti = tj Ti  t;xi]: (1)
To analyse rm survival, the most widely used semiparametric model in continuous-time
is the so-called proportional hazard model (Cox (1972)).3 This model assumes a parametric
form for the eect of the covariates on survival, but allows the form of the underlying survival
function to be unspecied. Thus the survival time of each rm i is assumed to follow a hazard
function given by
h(jxi) = h0()  exp(x
0
i) (2)
3See the overview of the recent Industrial Organization literature on rm survival by Manj on-Antolin and
Arauzo-Carod (2008).
5where  is a vector (k  1) of parameters. h0() is the baseline hazard function (the hazard
when each covariate x
j
i = 0) whose functional form is not specied. The equivalent of the
continuous-time proportional hazard model in discrete-time is the complementary log-log
model dened as
cloglog(hi;t)  lnf ln(1   hi;t)g (3)
and the corresponding model as
cloglog(hi;s) = 1d1;s + 2d2;s + ::: + JdJ;s + x
0
i;s (4)
where d1;t, ..., dJ;s are dummy variables for years 1, ..., J, J referring to the last time period
observed for any rm in the sample, with dt;s = 1 if s = t, 0 otherwise. The parameters  in
equation (4) are identical to the parameters in the underlying continuous-time proportional
hazards model dened by equation (2). It means that the complementary log-log model co-
ecients have a direct relative risk interpretation as noted above. Similarly, the time-specic
constants t can be written as function of the baseline hazard function h0(). By estimating
these parameters freely for each time-point, no assumption is done regarding the shape of
this baseline hazard function within the time intervals. Thus, the complementary log-log
model retains some of the exibility of the nonparametric approach.
The problem of unobserved heterogeneity stems frequently from incomplete specication
in (2). The solution is to incorporate multiplicative unobserved heterogeneity uncorrelated
with regressors. This individual unobserved heterogeneity component is known in the survival
analysis literature as "frailty". It is a multiplicative term and thus measures a proportional
increase or decrease in the hazard rate relative to that of an average rm. In the proportional
hazard model dened in (2), unobserved heterogeneity is thus accounted by the inclusion of
the multiplicative term i, which is assumed to be positive, i.e.
h(jxi) = h0()  exp(x
0
i)  i (5)
The random variable  summarizes the impact of "omitted variables" on the hazard rate,
whether the missing regressors are intrinsically unobservable or simply unobserved in the
data set to hand. Alternative interpretations are proposed in terms of errors of measurement
in recorded regressors or recorded survival times.
The corresponding discrete-time complementary log-log model with frailty becomes now:
cloglog(hi;s) = 1d1;s + 2d2;s + ::: + JdJ;s + x
0
i;s + "i (6)
where "i = log(i). Usually, it is assumed that "i, or, equivalently, i, is generated according
to a given parametric distribution function. Usual generating distribution functions are the
Gamma and the Gaussian distributions.
Parameters in equation (4), i.e. when no frailty is assumed, can be estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques applied to a binary choice model with a complementary log-
log link. Indeed, by construction, each rm's survival story is broken into a set of discrete
time units that can be treated as distinct observations. Then, a binary choice model that
predicts whether exit did or did not occur in each time unit can be estimated. More formally,
it can be easily shown that
hi;s = Prob[Ti = sj Ti  s; xi]
= Prob[yi;s = 1j xi] (7)
6where yi;s is an indicator for the exit occurring at time s for rm i. Unobserved heterogene-
ity can be accounted for by including random eects "i, i = 1;:::;n, in this binary choice
model framework (see equation (6)). If a specic parametric distribution is assumed for these
random eects, calculating the marginal likelihood function involves now a one-dimensional
integral that can be computed numerically.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the estimation results for four discrete-time proportional hazard models. In
the rst column of this table, we present the estimates of a complementary log-log model
that does not include any potential unobserved individual heterogeneity (model 1). Dummies
denoted by year== j, j = 2;:::;16, are created to represent the years where a rm may be
present in the sample. In the second column, estimates of the same model but now incorpo-
rating dierent eects of AOCsharet with respect to the size of the rm (small, medium, or
big) (model 2) are reported. Models 3 and 4 correspond to models 1 and 2, respectively, but
now including an unobserved individual heterogeneity term. The latter is assumed to follow
a Gaussian distribution. The relative importance of unobserved individual heterogeneity for
the two models is indicated by the estimates for . This parameter measures the share of in-
dividual variation in the hazard rate that is due to variation in the unobserved factors. Tests
can be performed to assess if this share is signicant or not. Thus, if the null hypothesis of
 = 0 cannot be rejected, we can conclude that frailty is unimportant. Estimates of models
3 and 4 are given in the third and four columns of table 1, respectively.
Both for models 3 and 4, the tests for unobserved individual heterogeneity, i.e. the like-
lihood ratio tests of the null hypothesis of  = 0, allow us to reject the null hypothesis that
unobserved individual heterogeneity is not relevant. Accounting for unobserved individual
heterogeneity signicantly increases the respective likelihoods. Moreover, the share of indi-
vidual variation in the hazard rate due to variation of unobserved factors accounts for nearly
83% of the total variation in the hazard rate for the two model specications. In other words,
ignoring unobserved individual heterogeneity would not be a good idea when discussing the
impacts of the covariates on hazard rate. For instance, comparison of the estimates of mod-
els 1 and 2 (without frailty) with those of models 3 and 4 (with frailty) reveals that, even if
qualitative results for fraitly models do not dier from those for no fraitly ones, the estimates
of the coecients of the covariates in the models with frailty are much larger in absolute
value than those of non frailty models, as expected (Jenkins (2005)). Therefore the following
analysis will focus on the estimation results of models 3 and 4.
Models 3 and 4 dier in how the eect of the share of AOC in total cheese production
is modeled. A direct eect of AOCsharet on the rate of hazard is considered in the rst
model while AOCsharet interacts with the size of the rm in the second. To choose between
the two models, we note that the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the
eect of AOCsharet is the same whatever the size of the rm. Results in table 1 show that
while increasing the volume of AOC labeled production signicantly reduces the probability
of failure (model 3), cross eect estimates from model 4 are signicant only for small rms.
Engaging in AOC production increases thus signicantly the survival of small rms while
7Table 1: Complementary log-log model
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. ( s.e.) Coef. ( s.e.) Coef. ( s.e.)
year==2 0.131 0.135 0.132 0.135 1.043*** 0.236 1.096*** 0.243
year==3 0.136 0.139 0.135 0.139 1.619*** 0.326 1.694*** 0.337
year==4 0.001 0.149 0.001 0.149 1.915*** 0.394 2.010*** 0.407
year==5 0.586*** 0.132 0.589*** 0.132 2.946*** 0.454 3.065*** 0.470
year==6 0.225 0.158 0.233 0.158 3.023*** 0.524 3.182*** 0.544
year==7 -0.025 0.177 -0.017 0.177 3.013*** 0.565 3.189*** 0.587
year==8 0.854*** 0.143 0.864*** 0.143 4.227*** 0.603 4.421*** 0.627
year==9 -0.348 0.231 -0.337 0.231 3.285*** 0.662 3.483*** 0.685
year==10 -0.219 0.236 -0.204 0.236 3.475*** 0.672 3.685*** 0.697
year==11 0.088 0.217 0.105 0.217 3.958*** 0.689 4.168*** 0.714
year==12 -0.485 0.286 -0.469 0.286 3.497*** 0.726 3.705*** 0.749
year==13 -0.166 0.263 -0.149 0.264 3.944*** 0.734 4.169*** 0.759
year==14 -0.290 0.287 -0.272 0.287 3.926*** 0.755 4.161*** 0.781
year==15 -0.046 0.271 -0.029 0.271 4.331*** 0.770 4.569*** 0.796
year==16 0.067 0.264 0.079 0.264 4.493*** 0.775 4.717*** 0.801
AOCsharet -0.678*** 0.097 -1.020*** 0.196
Mediumt -1.042*** 0.135 -1.270*** 0.167 -2.134*** 0.264 -2.617*** 0.329
Bigt -1.261*** 0.178 -1.369*** 0.195 -2.703*** 0.380 -3.007*** 0.428
MESt -0.198** 0.076 -0.192* 0.076 -0.651*** 0.158 -0.671*** 0.160
Oldt 0.253*** 0.077 0.270*** 0.077 0.432* 0.181 0.471* 0.184
AOCShareSmallt -0.764*** 0.101 -1.228*** 0.210
AOCSharMediumt 0.169 0.319 0.433 0.504
AOCShareBigt 0.060 0.587 0.350 0.921
Constant -2.323*** 0.111 -2.316*** 0.111 -4.456*** 0.471 -4.550*** 0.489
b  0.829 0.038 0.839 0.036
Log-Likelihood -2913.766 -2909.557 -2896.871 -2891.482
LRT of  = 0 :
Chi2-value 33.790 36.151
P-value 0.000 0.000
LRT of the same eect of
AOCsharet whatever the
size of the rm
Chi2-value 10.779
P-value 0.005
Notes : ,  and  indicate the signicance of the estimated parameters at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
8there is no such evidence for larger rms. This does not suggest that AOC labeling is not
protable for larger rms. It may be a useful tool among others (brand strategy, production
diversication, etc...) for large rms to increase their prots but it is not a key determinant
for their protability while smaller rms rely more on AOC to stay competitive on the
market. Notice that being a larger rm increases signicantly the probability to survive.
When larger, rms are able to benet from economy of scale and economy of scope, they
can also increase their investments to develop their brands, dierentiate their products or
increase their production capacity. The labeling policy can be seen as a public intervention
tool for small rms that are less likely to be able to invest to make their products known
by consumers. Finally, results show that even if AOC labeling is key driver of rm survival,
eciency (producing at or above the minimum eciency scale) remains a highly signicant
determinant of protability and survival.
In order to visualize the eect of AOC labeling and its interaction with other covariates,
we proceed now with the prediction of the hazard rate using the frailty model 4. We start
with predicting
z(s) = b 1d1;s + b 2d2;s + ::: + b JdJ;s + x
0b  + " (8)
for given values of the covariates x and of the unobserved heterogeneity term ", using the
estimated coecients (b j;b j) of models with frailty. Then the hazard rate can be predicted
as
h(s) = 1   exp( exp(z(s))) (9)
using the reciprocal of the complementary log-log transformation dened in equation (3). In
order to investigate more precisely the impact of PDO labeling policy, we x the values of
the covariates and consider an hypothetical small rm which has been created before 1990
and which produces cheese with a small proportion of PDO cheese and above the minimum
eciency rate (case 1a) . We analyze what will be the impact on its survival when this hy-
pothetical rm is more oriented toward AOC labeled production (case 1b). Then we perform
the same analysis for two other hypothetical rms which dier by their size (medium size
rm in case 2 and large rm in case 3). In all cases, predictions are derived assuming that
the frailty term is set equal to its mean value.
Figure 1 shows that the probability to survive for such an hypothetical rm after 10 years
is quite small (less than 20%), while those of larger rms is more than 80% and remains
relatively high even after 15 years. Predictions show no signicant dierences in the survival
rate between medium and large rms the 8 rst years and only a small dierence after that
period. When the hypothetical small rm becomes more AOC label oriented (case 1b), its
predicted survival rate is increased but the rm achieves a survival rate that remains below
the rate for larger rms. Labeling strategy does not compensate the size eect on the survival
rate. However, for medium and large rms, we get a opposite but rather small eect of the
label on survival.
A focus on small rms helps understanding the impact of the label for dierent charac-
teristics of the rm (cf. gure 2). We examine two extreme situations (compared to case 1)
, one where the rm is no more ecient but created after 1990 (case 4) and the worst one
where the rm is no more ecient and created before 1990 (case 5). While age and eciency
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10but also AOC policy do not seem to inuence the survival rate the rst 3 years, the pattern
of survival is greatly inuenced after 3 years. When the hypothetic old rm becomes less
ecient (moving from case 1a to case 5a), its predicted survival rate is signicantly reduced.
In addition, when such a rm becomes younger (moving from case 5a to case 4a), the age
eect compensates the eciency eect. AOC labeling increases the survival rate up to 30%
and up to 40% in the worst situation. A second feature of the label is that it inuences less
the survival rate after 12 years. After this survival length, the patterns of survival rates with
or without AOC converge. This suggests that the AOC labeling policy is an eective tool to
maintain the activity of small rm businesses at the medium run but not in a longer run.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we assess the ability of quality labeling policy to sustain the competitiveness
of agro-food rms involved in such a policy and determine which rms have beneted from
it. We more specically analyze how AOC quality label has contributed to the development
of dairy rms and to the current structure of the dairy industry. This analysis relies on a
detailed database on French dairy rms that combines accounting data as well as production
data. The performance of dairy rms is measured through their life duration on the market
or survival. We use recent tools in statistical analysis of duration data to estimate the impact
of various determinants of rm performances including AOC labeling. These tools allow for
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity in the specication of the hazard rate.
Our results conrm existing ndings in the literature on rm survival determinants. We nd
that the size eect is the main determinant of rm survival in the dairy industry. In addition,
the AOC labeling eect is less pronounced than the size eect. However, when it interacts
with rm size, the benet of being more specialized in AOC production shows up for small
rms only. In other words, encouraging AOC production reduces the risk of exiting for small
rms. Public intervention in this industry is well designed to increase the competitiveness
of small rms enabling the coexistence on the market of both small and large rms. AOC
labeling can act as a dierentiation tool in the market where small niche rms are able to
survive thanks to a reduced price competition. This generates a lower hazard rate for this
rms that it would be without the implementation of the quality label. We can then presume
that without the label policy, the market would be more concentrated. Further work and
more detailed data on the dairy markets would be needed to better understand how the label
policy aects the dairy market structure.
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